Abstract This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of contest success functions of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7: [283][284][285][286][287][288][289][290] 1996) and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201-204, 1998) to contests between groups.
Introduction
Contests often take place between groups. In lobbying and rent-seeking contests, many lobbyists work together on the same side. In R&D races, groups of researchers team together in order to develop new technologies earlier than rival teams. Further examples are wars and sport tournaments. By now there is a substantial literature on group contests. 1 Skaperdas (1996) provides, in an important paper, an axiomatic characterization of contest success functions. He deals with contests between individuals. Clark and Riis (1998) generalize Skaperdas (1996) by dropping the assumption of symmetry. The purpose of the present paper is to extend these axiomatic foundations to contests between groups. In a group contest, each member of a group can invest time, resources, or effort in order to increase the probability of his group winning. 2 I propose a set of axioms for group contests that are close analogous to those studied by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) . In particular, if each group consists of only one individual, then the axioms are similar to the axioms in Skaperdas (1996) . Following Clark and Riis (1998), however, I allow for asymmetries. This is natural for group contests since groups may have different sizes.
Skaperdas (1996, Theorem 1) shows that, under a set of reasonable axioms, the probability of individual i winning a contest is given by
whenever the denominator is positive, where x j is the effort of individual j, and the function f : R + → R + is sometimes referred to as the impact function. The axioms laid out below generalize this to group contests and allow for asymmetries (Theorem 1). Under these axioms, whenever at least one individual chooses a strictly positive effort, the probability of group g winning is given by
where for each group k, x k denotes the vector of efforts of the m k members of group k, and f k : R m k + → R + is a non-negative and strongly increasing function. Moreover, Skaperdas (1996, Theorem 2) shows that, if the contest success function is homogenous of degree zero, his axioms imply a Tullock contest success function. The generalization to a group contest given here (Theorem 2) results in a contest success function of the form given in (1), where all the impact functions f k are homogeneous of the same degree. I also generalize the axiomatic foundation of a logistic contest success function (Theorem 3).
Finally, I consider an axiom stating that the probability of success remains unchanged if the effort of one individual increases by some amount while the effort of another individual belonging to the same group decreases by the same amount. This leads to functional forms for group contest success functions that have frequently been used in the literature. 3 If the contest success function is homogeneous of degree
